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JUDGES
By Judge John H. Denison of the Denver Bar*
I
LUTARCH tells of Caesar that he divorced his wife because she had been so compromised that some disbelieved her innocence and that Caesar's wife must be
above suspicion.
One would like to hear her side of the case; whether she
thought that Caesar's wife's husband ought not also to be
above suspicion and whether she had not some claim to his
loyalty and his powerful protection against wrong. But she,
so far as we know, was silent.
Not so with the judges of our courts. They may give a
reason for every judicial act and usually do so. The judges
of our higher courts do so at great length and it is right that
they .should for there are more reasons why they should be
above suspicion than why Mrs. Caesar should be so.
II
There are many kinds of judges, not easily classified. The
categories are not mutually exclusive and admit of no exact
definition.
A great majority of judges are well intentioned. In that
respect they are like a majority of mankind; but the proportion of well intentioned judges is greater, I think, than of men.
It would be strange if it were not so, because they who spend
their lives in consideration of what is right and wrong, not
only ought and usually do know what is right better than ordinary men but become more disposed toward it.
But an occasional Bacon or Jeffreys is found on the bench;
lawyers of great ability but using it for their own profit or
advancement, excusing themselves to themselves by one argu*Formerly Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court.
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ment or another as necessity may require. Such are rare
among us, but here and there a judge, like Bacon, accepts
favors, immunities, gratuities, presents, promotions, and persuades himself that he is just notwithstanding; or prostitutes
his office for political favor or advancement like Jeffreys.
III
A long time ago a lawyer friend of mine told me of a
conversation he had with one then on the bench in Colorado
about the influences that operated on courts and judges and
the judge said to him that he was influenced by his friendships
and could not help showing favors to his friends. The circumstances were such that he was understood to mean his political friends. I do not think that he meant that he would
deliberately decide a case wrongly for friendship's sake, but
that his discretion would be exerted to that end; perhaps as
illustrated by the following:
A judge once said to me that in a case of political importance to his party, when the question was evenly balanced, he
decided according to his party's advantage. He was putting
it forward as the right thing to do. He would, I think, have
resented an accusation that he "leaned" toward his party, or
favored it judicially, still more that he favored his own advantage. But what else would he be doing? The decision
would favor his party and would be to his and his party's advantage and it would be so because he "leaned" that way
enough to overcome what would otherwise have been an even
balance. He would be biased, in the literal sense of that term.
If one like him but of the opposite party were in his place,
the case would go the other way. The decision then would be
for political reasons, not for legal ones, but his duty is to decide according to law; legal reasons were the only reasons he
could consider if he kept on lines of duty and honor; the law
and his oath permit a judge no other line of argument.
The judge's position, however, was otherwise wrong because it is impossible and absurd.
Impossible: because it is harder to tell whether a question
is evenly balanced than to decide it. It is a more difficult matter to investigate a legal point until by all the pros and cons
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one has shown that the question is even to a scale "within the
estimation of a hair" than to show it to tip one way or the
other. This is so because at last no such question is evenly
balanced. There is a right and wrong to every legal question.
To follow his plan, he must first decide what constitutes an
even balance, and whether the case in hand meets the definition. Seldom does a case involve one question only. Must
they all be evenly balanced, that is, every vital legal question
in the case be so close that the judge cannot make up his mind
which way to decide it? Surely they must, or else there would
be a legal reason for a decision.
Absurd: Suppose there is but one question upon which
the case depends. How can he be sure that his mind is evenly
balanced? When is a question evenly balanced? What does
he mean by "evenly balanced"? Does he mean that he cannot
determine an issue of fact? That is sometimes difficult but
never impossible. He always has a new trial or further evidence on call at his will, and when at last there is an even balance the rule of burden of proof requires a decision in the
negative. Does he mean that he does not know what the law
is? Let him study, read and investigate and ask for further
argument. Does he mean that the authorities are equal in
number and weight, or in such confusion that a clear rule cannot be deduced from them? Then he is free and can decide
as he thinks the law ought to be. And here is the crucial point.
If a judge ever reaches this position, which is not often, is he
absolved from his duty to decide according to law? May he
say "I do not know the law" or "I do not know the application of the law to present facts and so I will decide for political reasons, for the side which I personally favor and for my
own advantage"?
There is, of course, but one answer to such a question and
the judge himself knows it and proves that he knows it by giving other reasons for his decision. He knows that his real reason would be thought wrong and so dares not state it, but if he
states any at all, which he usually does, states reasons which
he intends shall be received by the bar and public as the real
and as sound and sufficient reasons for his decision. Indeed in
every case a judge either advances his true reasons, upon which
the question of even balance is out of the case altogether, or
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he intends to mislead and by giving false reasons conceal the
true one.
It would seem that the proposition in question would lead
to more injustice than is at first obvious, because one who is
disposed to decide one way is inclined to find reasons for so
doing and his eyes will tend to see in every case a doubt and
in every doubt an even balance. The opposite side then, is
fighting with one hand tied. His lawyers will work for their
fees and not with any hope that their arguments will be of
any avail.
To reduce this proposition to its lowest terms, it is thus:
If a judge knows no sufficient legal reason, he may decide for
a political one. This is absurd and it is fortunate for the country that not many judges think it otherwise.
IV
A Bacon has not deliberately determined to do wrong.
I will accept presents from both sides, perhaps he says to himself, but will decide according to law and equity. Even after
Bacon had been found guilty he said he was the justest judge
that had sat for seven ages.
There is a class of judges that take the same position now.
Like their famous predecessor they cannot understand why, if
they decide aright, their conduct should be criticized. Sometimes such a one takes the position that he has received the
gratuity for some reason not connected with the litigation of
the donor, or as a reward for other services; sometimes that
it is received after the decision, intending to provoke the inference that it did not influence him. It seems impossible to
convince him of his sin, or rather that his act was a sin.
A good test of the righteousness of such a stand is to ask
yourself whether you would like to have a judge in your case
accept gratuities from your opponent. Would you like to
have him, pending the case, expecting or even considering the
possibility of such a thing? Would you like to have him,
while the case was pending, contemplating employment by
your opponent after the decision? Would you like to have the
judge accept such employment? No, his position would be
as wrong as that of the political judge and for the same reason.
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V
It was told of the late Mr. Justice Brewer that, shortly
after he went on the supreme bench of the United States, a
great public corporation offered him the position of its chief
counsel at a salary several times greater than that which he
was receiving. The corporation then had a case before the
court which involved rights of enormous value, and, from his
previous decisions, the men in control believed or feared that
he would be against them, so they planned to remove him
from the bench in a lawful manner by employing him themselves. The offer was not accepted and the company lost the
case. Some of the members of the corporation were said to
have attributed their defeat to the, let us say, resentment of
the great jurist at their conduct. That a judge of his character would allow his feelings to govern or influence his decision we cannot believe, and, of course, every lawyer knows
he could not have controlled the other members of the court;
but, if the purpose of the offer was to influence the decision,
it failed.
What, then, would have been wrong with an acceptance
of it? To resign from the bench is not, per se, worthy of criticism. To accept the position of chief counsel for a corporation is not. Perhaps the circumstances were such that Mr.
Justice Brewer might have accepted the position and resigned
before the case was heard, and so have relieved the matter
from all question as to influence on his decision. Indeed, as
the story went, such was the intention. Was there -a good reason why he ought not to do so? We think there was. If he
knew or reasonably suspected the purpose he surely ought not
to accept, because by accepting he would be possibly aiding
in a decision upon improper reasons. But there is a further
reason: Next to having courts worthy of trust, the most important thing is to have the public understand that they are so.
The acceptance of such a position under such circumstances,
though with perfect honesty and honor, would, if the case
should go for the corporation, be misunderstood by a great
number, perhaps a majority of the people of this country. A
vague influence, powerful and wide, though erroneous, would
tend to create and support the suspicion, if not the belief, that
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there was a secret "pull" of some kind from which the court
was not wholly free, and the respect due that tribunal would
be thereby weakened. It is, then, the duty of a judge to avoid
the appearance of evil, as well as evil itself, and the acceptance of the employment, as we have above supposed, would
have violated that duty.
We do not vouch for the truth of the tale about Mr. Justice Brewer, but it accords with his character and well serves
as an illustration of our thesis that a judge ought to be and
ought to keep himself, like Caesar's wife-above suspicion.
It is a height difficult to attain, but any judge can approach
it and most judges do.

